• Prior to choosing, each agent observes a signal s i ∈ {L, H}.
.
• Assume a symmetric prior of 1 2 on each state.
• Agent at time t observes the choices of all agents in periods prior to t but not the signals.
• Inference is made based on equilibrium strategies.
• Consider maximally informative strategies in the sense that each agent follows her own signal if she is indifferent between two choices.
• Optimal play for 1: Choose following signal.
• Player 2 sees the action of player 1 and therefore infers player 1's signal perfectly.
• Let r denote the posterior probability that state is H.
• By informative equilibrium assumption, player 2 chooses also according to her signal if the her own signal conflicts that of player 1. In this case after Bayesian updating, she has a posterior of 1 2 on each state and by the tie-breaking assumption she follows own signal. If the signals are the same, it is clear that she will follow own signal.
• If 1 and 2 choose opposite to one another, then player 3 is in the same position as player 1. If 1 and 2 choose same actions, then player 3's own signal is not strong enough to overturn the public information from the choices of 1 and 2 and as a result, informational cascade starts.
• Player 4,5,6,... are exactly in the same position since the choices of all but 1 and 2 are completely uninformative.
• Conclusion is simple: Informational cascades will arise with probability 1 in finite time (since they start whenever there are three consecutive choices of the same action (or two if they happen to be right at the beginning). Furthermore, with positive probability the herd takes place on the (full-information) suboptimal action.
More General Signals
• Suppose now that there is a continuum of potential signals θ: with densities and
• Otherwise the model is exactly as above.
• In each period, the players see the action choices of prior players and their own signals.
• Private updating: p is the private posterior on H.
• Consider also the public belief on H after history h t = (a 1 , ..., a t−1 ):
• We consider a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a collection of strategies
and q t is computed under the prior on the state and using a s (q s , θ) for all s < t. For histories with zero probability, posteriors are assigned arbitrarily.
• The equilibrium decision rule can be rephrased as:
• We can compute the probability of observing action a at public history h t given public information and given state.
• Let ρ H (H, q t ) be the probability of observing action H if state is H and current public history is summarized by q t .
• We can do similar computations for the other states and other actions.
• Using Bayes' rule, we can write the updating of public beliefs in a convenient form using the public likelihood ratios and current action a:
where we have used the fact that each q t defines a unique l t .
• It is an easy exercise (done in class) to show that under true state H, l t+1 is a martingale with respect to the information sets generated by the equilibrium a s .
• By martingale convergence theorem, we know that the public beliefs must converge on a fixed point:
for some action a. Furthermore, we know that for all
The latter is inconsistent with the convergence of l t . Therefore either l t → 0 or actions converge in the interior. But this can only be possible if private beliefs are bounded.
Two examples
• Unbounded signals
• Assume throughout that the true state is H.
• Signals are on [0, 1].
• Let G H (θ) = 2θ and G L (θ) = 2(1 − θ). Then Bayes rule gives private beliefs:
• We can then calculate:
• Finally, we have
and l t+1 (L, l t ) = l t 2 + l t l t = 2 + l t .
• The latter equation has no fixed points and the first has a fixed point al l t = 0.
Therefore by martingale convergence theorem, we know that full learning will occur.
• It is useful to draw the phase diagram for the dynamics of beliefs to see how this works.
• Bounded signals
• Again by Bayes' rule,
• Therefore
• Therefore we have by plugging into the c.d.f. for the signals
and
• Since probabilities these probabilities are in ].
• Notice that now we have informational cascade on L when l t ≥ 2 and an informational cascade on H when l t ≤ 2 3 .
• Calculations similar to the unbounded case give:
• Hence we have two fixed points: l = 2 3
under action H and l = 2 under actionL.
• If the prior is in [ ], then public posterior remains in that range forever, Martingale convergence theorem says that the posterior converges to one of these, but actions may then converge on the wrong alternative with positive probability.
• Comments
• Notice that the argument that we followed is quite general.
• Suppose for instance that some players always choose H and each player is of such type with probability κ H . This is accommodated by adjusting the probabilities of observing action a, i.e. ρ ω (a, l t )
• Similarly, the introduction of multiple payoff types just introduces multiple equilibrium decision rules. This will again be reflected in ρ ω (a, q t ) . Otherwise the construction remains exactly as before.
• For details on how this can be done, see Smith and Sorensen, Econometrica 2000.
• 
Model
• N players
• State of nature ω with prior P (ω)
• Player i chooses stopping time t i and gets payoff v i (t i , ω) = v (t i , ω)
• Conditional on ω, v (t i , ω) is maximized at t i = ω
• Hence, ω is the first-best optimal stopping time for all players
Information and Payoffs
• We assume that the payoff function v is quasi-supermodular in (t i , ω).
• Examples include:
-Quadratic loss:
-Discounted loss from early stopping:
• Player i observes privately a signal θ i from a joint joint distribution G (θ, ω) on
• G is symmetric across i and conditional on ω, θ i is independent of θ j .
• Signals satisfy (MLRP) Assumption 1. For all i, θ > θ, and ω > ω,
• We also assume boundedly informative individual signals:
Assumption 2. There is a constant κ > 0 such that
• Probably generalizes to affiliated signals.
• Players observe each others' actions, but not their signals
Multi-stage timing game
• It is convenient to use continuous time
• But, how to deal with the simultaneous actions / infinitely quick responses?
• We define the game as a multi-stage timing game, where every stopping decision starts a new stage
• It is possible to have many consequtive stages where a player (or many players) stops at time t = 0.
• Interpretation: players stop sequentially but at the same "real time"
• In other words, players are able to respond quickly to information obtained from others
The Game
• Γ s k is the timing game of stage k, k = 1, ..., K
• It is a simultaneous move game, where each player chooses stopping time τ 
for a player that has not yet stopped at k
• Since the game remains in stage k only as long as no player stops, the choice of τ k (θ i ) is relevant only as far as
• Conditional on her stopping choice being payoff relevant at instant t in stage k, player i knows that
• To include the information flowing during a stage, we introduce the state variable:
Payoffs
• The payoff of i at the beginning of stage s k is the expected payoff conditional on the information at hand
• Players choose strategies that maximize their expected payoffs at each contingency
• By equilibrium we mean a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
• We focus on symmetric strategies
Informative equilibrium Theorem 1. The game has a symmetric equilibrium, where every player adopts at stage k the following strategy:
. Furthermore, this equilibrium is the best symmetric equilibrium in the payoff sense Two-state case
is the density of signals in state ω i .
• θ ∈ [0, 1].
• Posterior π(θ i , s k (t)) induced by the equilibrium strategies is a sufficient statistic.
• MLRP and quasi-supermodularity imply that the exit time of the marginal type is strictly increasing in π(θ i , s k (t)).
• Assume that u i (t i , ω) = −(t i − ω) 2 .
• Then
Let π (θ) be the posterior based on only one signal θ:
π (θ) is also the optimal stopping time of an isolated player with signal θ .
Optimal first stopping:
Posterior when θ(t) quits:
In terms of likelihood ratios:
(1 − F 1 (θ(t))) N −1
(1 − F 0 (θ(t))) N −1 .
Using equation (2), we have:
(1 − F 1 (θ(t)))
The order statistic under ω 0 has the c.d.f. 
Use next the equilibrium condition (5) to compute the time instant t(p) such that Pr{t 0 < t(p)} = p:
Taking limits gives:
MLRP implies that f 0 (0) > f 1 (0).
Distribution of the first stopping time in the limit N → ∞ is given by:
t(p) = t 0 Λ(p) 1 − t 0 + t 0 Λ(p) .
• Since t 0 < t(p) < 1 for all p > 0.
• Therefore first exit delayed and random even when N → ∞.
• The assumption of a quadratic payoff function is for notational simplicity only.
• Same argument works as long as optimal stopping increasing in π.
